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1. Background 
Concerns about the poor performance of the smallholder agricultural sector of the economy
has led to a proposal to create a parastatal organization to be known as the Crop Marketing
Authority (CMA).   A proposal was prepared that states that the CMA will provide crop
marketing support in areas with commercial potential, in partnership with the private sector,
and by administering reserve stocks, without imposing major costs on the treasury.
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The major crop marketing problems faced by Zambia’s small-scale farmers are perceived to
be low prices and low production of staples, leading to problems of low real incomes of
smallholder households and food shortages perceived to result from inadequacies of the
markets for staple crops and agricultural inputs.  The CMA is envisioned to help smallholders
overcome perceived problems of (1) high costs of marketing, (2) poor access to markets, (3)
market concentration leading to exploitative practices by traders, and (4) low prices that
result from points 1 through 3.
CMA is envisioned to replace the Food Reserve Agency (FRA), which was mandated in 1995
to maintain strategic reserve stocks in support of the emerging private commodity trading
sector. After six seasons of operation, the FRA is perceived as not having adequately
addressed the above marketing-related constraints, even though its mandate was primarily
related to maintaining a strategic food reserve. Therefore, it has been proposed that a new
agency (the CMA) be created to replace the FRA with an explicit expanded mandate to
redress these perceived problems of smallholder grain marketing.
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This paper aims to summarize the rationale and objectives of the CMA and the possible
consequences of adopting the proposed legislation.  We also identify where the proposal, in
its current form, requires additional specificity in order to evaluate its ability to meet
Government’s objectives of enhancing food security and sustainable crop marketing.
Although the CMA Concept Note refers to food crops in general, and highlights the
importance of not focusing entirely on maize, we realize that maize will inevitably be the
biggest tradeable food commodity that the CMA will handle.  For that reason, the analysis in
this report focuses on maize marketing.
2. Key questions related to the proposed role and activities of CMA
According to the CMA Concept Note, the functions of the CMA under consideration would
be as follows:
a. Crop marketing: Its main functions would be to provide a market for food
commodities, in partnership with the private sector, in areas where crop
production and trade can occur on a commercial basis, without continuous3 This transitional role and mandate to support the private sector’s capacity also characterized the
Government’s rationale for the FRA, the Agricultural Credit Management Programme, and all other forms of
government involvement in fertilizer and maize marketing since the ostensible agricultural reform program in
1993.
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subsidies, and to provide market facilitation services such as market
information and promotion of grades and standards. The intended benefits
would be to provide smallholders with a market for their food commodities, in
the process developing private sector capacity. Another benefit would be
increased marketed output of food commodities for the supply of major
consumption centers to meet expanding food requirements and enhanced
producer incomes.
The CMA Concept Note specified that CMA’s crop marketing activities
would focus on providing crop marketing opportunities in areas with
“commercial potential,” where the private sector is not sufficiently active.
Therefore, the apparent design of the CMA is not to provide a market for
maize in every district in Zambia, but rather to cater for smallholders who can
grow crops like maize profitably given realistic supply and demand conditions
in the country, but are not being adequately served by the private sector.  This
assumes that there are unexploited commercial trading opportunities that
CMA will develop in a profitable manner, without providing long term
subsidies.  The CMA Concept Note also specifies that in selecting
commodities and purchase areas, “...the economic viability of production and
marketing of specific crops will be considered, under competitive and
commercial terms. Areas in which it is unprofitable for farmers to grow maize
will not be selected, but in such areas alternative crops can be identified and
considered, thus promoting crop diversification”. This implies that the CMA
will need to operate as efficient, or more efficiently than the private sector in
terms of the marketing costs it incurs, such that it is able to offer competitive
prices to farmers without accumulating trading deficits.
The concept note highlights the importance of CMA working in partnership
with the private sector in order to develop its capacity, and mentions crop
marketing support as being a “transitional” activity to be phased out as the
private sector develops its capacity.
3  The document further states that CMA
will have “a presence” in each district, although it is implied that it may not
necessarily be in the form of a buying depot, but in the form of playing a
facilitating role, e.g. by providing local market information.
b. Food reserve management: To maintain strategic reserve stocks sufficient to
ensure market supplies in Zambia for three months. The intended benefits
would include improved national-level food security and reduced inter-
seasonal supply and price instability.
Given that the private sector also holds stocks this implies that CMA would
only need to store the balance between what the private sector is likely to3
stock and the estimated market requirements.   It is highly possible, however,
that private sector storage will be influenced by stockholding behavior of the
CMA.  According to the CMA Concept Note, the estimated CMA
stockholding requirement is 100,000 MT, but this may underestimate actual
requirements depending on how the CMA behaves in practice, how private
traders reacts to this, and the extent to which the private sector is encouraged
to participate in the market.  
The Government proposal states that it will manage reserve stock separately
from crop marketing activities.  Stocks would be obtained from CMA itself as
well as from commercial farmers.
 
c. Input Distribution:  Although the CMA Task Force has proposed not to
include input and credit delivery as part of CMA’s mandate, there are others
who have insisted that it be included. This may include distribution of credit in
the form of fertilizer.
The actual impacts of the CMA will not be clear until its broad conceptual mandate as
specified in the Government Concept Note are translated into detailed implementation
modalities.  This task remains to be done.  To assess the CMA’s ability to meet its stated
government objectives, we identify the following questions for analysis:
1.   How will Government determine “areas with potentially profitable market
opportunities but where private sector involvement is currently insufficient,”
and where are they located?
2.  Where are the rural marketed volumes and where can crop buying centers be
justified on commercial grounds?
3.  If the CMA is to buy and sell at market prices to avoid incurring trading
deficits (as implied in the CMA proposal), then to what extent will
smallholders gain as compared to the current situation?
4.  If higher-than-market-prices were offered, what additional production can be
expected?  Which smallholders would be able to respond to higher rural
prices?  What would be the impact of buying at higher-than-market-prices on
the national treasury?
5.  If CMA wishes to purchase sufficient volumes of maize to put upward
pressure on producer prices in smallholder areas of Zambia, what effect would
this have on wholesale and retail prices of maize and maize meal? 
6.  Can sufficient volumes of maize be procured from small-scale farmers to meet
the needs of urban and rural deficit areas, or will national food security also
require new Government approaches for stabilizing supplies from additional
sources inside and outside of Zambia?4 The PHS is an nationally representative annual survey of roughly 7,500 small- and medium-scale
farm households in Zambia, conducted by the Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.
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7.  Are food reserve stocks a cost-effective route for stabilizing national food
supplies and prices?
8.  How will CMA be able to overcome the problems of patronage and
interference that plagued NAMBOARD and FRA?
Clear answers to these questions depend largely on the CMA’s implementation modalities,
which have yet to be specified.   Nevertheless, the remainder of this paper explores the
potential implications of alternative forms of CMA operations, based on available data on
maize production and market performance in Zambia.
3. Where are the potential geographical areas for increased marketed maize
output by smallholders? Which of those areas are consistent producers and
least vulnerable to adverse weather conditions?
One objective of CMA is to improve the level of grain production.  Would a relatively small
potential improvement in farm gate prices made possible by the CMA performing the
marketing function expand the level of grain production?  This section identifies districts that
could potentially produce and supply enough surplus maize to warrant a CMA presence. 
Data is not available to directly estimate producers’ supply response to prices.  However,
analysis of Post Harvest Survey data (1999/00 production year) on district-level maize
production and marketing patterns of small- and medium-scale farmers provides some
indication of where increased market potential might arise.
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For analytical purposes, we categorize Zambia’s districts into the following four categories. 
First, producers in net-purchasing districts – i.e., districts where more maize is purchased
than sold, implying an importation of maize into the district – already receive relatively high
market prices since the sellers are competing with grain imported from outside the district.  In
these districts, a commercially-oriented CMA could not expect to increase prices to
producers.  Its impact on maize production would therefore be very limited.  Second, districts
where maize is not the primary staple crop in either production or consumption, and where
little is bought or sold, are assumed to be in areas not well suited to grain production
(otherwise they would produce more for their own use) or in areas where maize is culturally a
less important crop.  Third, districts that were self-sufficient and consumed relatively high
quantities of maize per capita were assumed to have a proven capacity to produce grain and
would become net exporters of grain with better market prices.   Fourth, districts that are
already net exporters are assumed to have clear capacity to produce grain and to be already
connected to the market and could be expected to expand marketing activity even further
with higher prices.
The country’s districts were, thus, grouped into these four categories on the basis of maize
production, consumption and net sales:5
1. Net maize purchasing districts:  districts where mean household maize and mealie meal
purchases (the latter expressed as maize equivalent) were substantial.  In this analysis, net
purchases (and sales) of 100 kg (two 50 kg bags) or more were considered as substantial,
based on the observed distribution of sales among smallholders.  There were nine districts
identified in this category from the 1999/00 crop season, six of which are in Southern
Province and the remainder in Western and Northwestern provinces.  In many of these
districts, maize production is low due to climatic constraints and/or consumption preferences
for a variety of other food crops. 
2. Marginal producer/consumer districts:  districts where, on average, smallholder
households produce less than the national average of one metric tonne (MT), consume less
than the national average of 0.9 MT, and have net maize sales between -100 and 100 kg (i.e.
purchase up to two bags, or sell up to two bags).  This category includes 25 districts where
maize is not a major crop, either in the production system or in consumption patterns.  These
districts are primarily in Northern, Luapula, Western and Northwestern provinces.
3. Net maize selling districts:   districts where mean household net maize sales were 100 kg
or greater.   There were 33 net seller districts in the 1999/00 crop season (the 2000/01
marketing year) that had combined net sales of 136,000 MT.  Of this quantity, almost 90%
originated from Southern, Central, Eastern and Copperbelt provinces. The remainder came
from Northern, Lusaka and Northwestern provinces.
4. Maize self-sufficient districts:  districts where, on average, smallholder households
produce more than the national average of one MT, consume more than the national average
of 0.9 MT, but have between -100 and 100 kg of net maize sales.  This category includes
three districts in Eastern Province - Chadiza, Mambwe and Nyimba - where maize production
and consumption is high, and where expanded production for sale outside the district is
conceivable.
The districts falling under each of the four categories are listed in Appendices 1 and 2.
Appendix 1 presents those districts that have potential to expand production and supply to the
market (net sellers, and self-sufficient districts). Appendix 2 presents the remaining two
categories identified as having almost no potential to supply maize to the market (net maize
purchasing districts, and low-producing-low consuming districts).  
Production and outflow of maize produced by smallholders in 2001 and 2002 were lower
than in 2000 because much of the maize from the 2000 crop was  produced in high-risk areas
such as Southern Province. If a CMA could provide incentives that would bring about
production shifts to more climatically suitable areas with commercial potential, it would
improve food security and price stability. Is this an appropriate role for a CMA?
National maize production has fluctuated widely, between some 1.1 million MT in 2000 and
600,000 MT in 2002. If we compare the production estimates from 1999/00 (a surplus
season) and 2000/01 (a deficit season) by district, there are a number of districts that show
little fluctuation and would seem most appropriate for promoting increased production of
staple food crops (Appendices 1 and 2).  Examples are Choma, Mazabuka and Namwala in
Southern Province, all of which showed increased production levels in 2001, as compared to
the 2000 harvest. However, further district-level analysis is required to incorporate additional5 Annual median prices were computed based on data obtained from the 1999/00 post-harvest survey
of small- and medium-scale farmers by the Central Statistical Office. In the survey, each interviewed household
was asked to state the price they received for the largest quantity of maize sold for cash. Thus, these prices
reflect the peak marketing season, which falls somewhere around or just after harvest time. The authors opted to
use the median prices, and not mean prices, because the farm-gate price data had too many outliers.
6 Distances, unit transport rates, and handling and CMA fixed costs per tonne were estimated from
maps from the Roads Department, private transportation companies (Dubica, etc), consultations with private
business people, and the Food Reserve Agency, respectively. 
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food deficit seasons, as some of the above districts have been negatively affected by drought,
for example during the 2002/03 season.
4. Is access to markets a problem for smallholders and can it be addressed by
the proposed CMA?
A major function of the CMA is to provide marketing services as a supplement to the private
market to assure market access to smallholders. The perceived problem is that smallholder
farmers in some areas do not have access to markets paying adequate prices.  The question is
whether the CMA could manage resources in a way that would provide market services to
areas not served by the private market at higher prices considered adequate and still operate
with out losing money.  The question has several parts.
Do private traders miss opportunities to make a profit by offering to buy and move grain
from many areas producing grain surpluses for the market?  The answer would probably be
affirmative.   Lack of information about available supplies, and transportation bottlenecks are
likely to lead to some missed opportunities.  How big an opportunity is there for a CMA to
profitably extend marketing services?  We do not know for certain.  In order to obtain an
estimate, district-level data on smallholder market sales of maize were analyzed, whereby
median maize prices received by smallholder farmers in each district were compared with
median prices in every other district.
5  Then a calculation was made to find out for how many
districts was the difference in prices greater than the cost of transportation and handling cost
making it potentially profitable to have moved grain from high to low price districts.  
To do this, the cost of moving maize among markets/districts (estimated as the product of
district-to-district road distances and unit transportation rates plus loading and offloading
costs and CMA fixed costs per metric tonne
6) and price differences between all district pairs
were used to identify potentially profitable maize flow patterns and areas for possible
beneficial intervention by the CMA. The result of this analysis – a list of districts with
positive gross margins – is then combined with the information gained from the district
categorization exercise (as presented in the previous section) to identify districts with both
potential to produce and supply maize to the market and potential for the supplied maize to
be shipped profitably to other markets.
According to this analysis, of the 36 districts with a potential for increased volumes of maize
production (from categories c. and d. as described in previous section), 22 districts appear to
be potentially able to supply maize to other districts at a profit (see Table 1). The existing
positive price differentials suggests that some trading opportunities may have existed but
were left unexploited. These 22 districts are mostly located in Central, Copperbelt, Lusaka,7
Eastern and Southern provinces (see Appendices 1 and 2), which is largely where the private
sector has been known to concentrate its operations.
This seems to put an upper limit on the number of districts that would possibly support a
CMA buying station without operating at a loss. Even then, the trading opportunities that we
have so far assumed may not necessarily exist for the CMA in each of these districts. The
CMA’s costs may actually be greater than the estimates in our analysis reported largely from
private sector sources.  Operating at a profit requires substantial volumes and we have no
data about the break-even volume a buying agent would handle in competition with private
traders.
Table 1.  Districts with profitable CMA maize trading potential and districts with maize





profitably Profitable trade destination(s)
Districts with maize
production potential
but where trade is
unprofitable
(1) (2) (3)















Lusaka Province Chongwe Southern, Lusaka
Kafue Southern, Lusaka




Namwala Southern, Lusaka, Copperbelt
Northern Province Mbala Northern Kasama
Mpika
Nakonde
Northwestern Pr. Mufumbwe Northwestern Kasempa
Mwinilunga Northwestern8
The logic of the analysis is that without effective competition it would be expected that
annual median prices, representing the typical prices for a district, would differ by more than
the costs of moving grain between markets. The data indicate that for the 1999/00 crop year,
there were 22 districts where price spreads were much higher than the estimated costs of
moving grain between them.  This suggests that opportunities to add a large competitor such
as CMA were limited, as long as it operated with a hard financial constraint.  Based on this
preliminary evidence, it appears that the CMA would have limited scope to increase producer
prices.
The remaining 14 districts with physical productive potential to supply maize to the market
have negative gross margins, implying that the transfer and handling costs exceed the
expected marketing margins. Under these conditions, these districts cannot foster a profitable
maize business for the CMA. Alternative strategies other than direct government
participation in buying and selling may offer better options. A threshold level of investment
in infrastructure (such as roads and communications) and support institutions may be
required to make these districts profitable suppliers of maize. The same is true for the
remaining districts we judge as having limited maize production expansion potential without
offering producer subsidies (categories a. and b. in previous section).  The costs and benefits
of offering subsidized producer prices is examined later in the paper.
Clearly, most small-scale farm households are very poor.   Those able to produce grain for
the market would be better off with higher maize prices. The question here is: Would
smallholders be better off from policies to directly support producer prices vs. policies to
improve profitability through reducing the costs of production and marketing.  Lower costs of
fuel (a 45% tax on diesel is currently being levied), lower costs of transportation from
improved infrastructure, and policies to reduce taxes on imported capital equipment and
spares are likely prospects for this cost reduction.  Imperfect competition may also leave
some farmers with prices below competitive market levels.  The CMA proposal to provide
market facilitating services could contribute to improved prices by facilitating transportation
coordination and greater competition through monitoring and information. Perhaps if the
CMA had the capacity to offer information about effective  productivity-enhancing practices
and other related services to stimulate production of a surplus for the market it could be a
viable economic agent in the other districts.  But that converts it to another type of agency
raising another set of questions.
5. Rural marketing costs are high, due to low volumes and geographical spread.
How will this affect CMA buying operations? Are there opportunities to
benefit from a greater concentration of commercially oriented smallholders in
selected areas?
Of the rural smallholders’ maize surplus in 1999/00 (17% of total smallholder maize
production), the majority (91%) originated from Central, Eastern, Southern and Copperbelt
provinces, mainly servicing the Copperbelt and Lusaka markets.
For that crop year, 27% of all small- and medium-scale farmers in the country sold any maize
(Appendix 3).  Marketed sales were highly concentrated, with 10 % of these households
selling 90 % of the maize marketed by the small- and medium-scale sector.  It is not known
for certain how much additional grain could be forthcoming from an increase in producer9
prices.  However, a survey of the supply response literature shows very low price elasticities
of supply especially under conditions of weak infrastructure and input supply systems
(Binswanger, 1990). Typical supply elasticity estimates are in the range of +0.2 to +0.4.  If
we assume that the CMA activities would be able to raise producer prices by 10 % in the
major surplus regions of the country, then this might be expected to generate a 2% to 4%
increase in national maize production and sales.
Because farmers sell maize over a number of months at different places
within districts to a multitude of buyers (including neighboring households), the quantities
handled by any one marketing agent would be very small.  This has important economic
significance since the costs of handling and transporting are much higher for small quantities. 
With small individual transactions and small total sales, relatively few buyers can profitably
participate in a given area.  Of very practical importance for implementing a program of
district  purchasing by a CMA is the question of how many of the districts have sufficient
quantities to support a major purchasing agent in the district?  The available data shows that
during the 1999/00 production season, smallholders in only eight out of the 22 districts with
maize trade potential made enough combined maize sales to fill at least one “CIDA shed”
(sheds with a capacity to store 5,000 MT of grain, constructed throughout the country with
CIDA funding during the 1980s). These eight districts are Chibombo, Mkushi, Mumbwa,
Petauke, Choma, Kalomo, Monze and Mazabuka. All other districts had much more limited
potential with combined sales of less than 5,000 MT.  These already small quantities of
marketed maize in a good crop year would have been strongly reduced during the 2001/02
season. The introduction of a CMA buying station intent on competing for enough grain
purchases to break even, if successful,  would appear to leave little room for large regional 
private market competitors in most districts. 
This conclusion is consistent with the observation that it is relatively easy to enter the
business of trading and transporting grain.  It would be expected that informal traders would
have lower labor cost than a parastatal organization.  Before assuming that a CMA could
operate effectively in competition with private traders resulting in higher prices offered to
small holders, studies of comparative costs between private traders and a CMA would be in
order.
6. Is commodity price support an option for CMA to promote production and
income improvements for smallholder farmers?
Although the CMA Concept Note does not suggest that the CMA should operate it’s
commodity market program in such a way that it would increase prices paid to smallholder
farmers to provide higher than competitive market prices,  there are others who believe prices
received by smallholder farmers for commodities are often too low and would favor
including a price support function or objective for  the CMA, at least for disadvantaged and
remote areas.  Because it is likely to be a continuing issue, some of the problems with a price
support program as might be operated by a CMA are examined.
First, any program intervention resulting in higher maize prices to sellers of maize would
directly benefit only a small proportion of farmers.  Appendix 3 shows that only 27 % of the
small- and medium-scale farm holdings sell maize (sum of columns 1 through 3 in the last10
row). Moreover, the smallholder maize market is also highly concentrated, with more than
three-quarters (80 %) of the sales attributed to less than 30 % of the sellers (Appendix 4). A
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with household income as the dependent variable
has shown, with more than 99 % confidence, that in general  maize sellers are the better off
farmers. When the quantity of maize sold is considered, an unambiguously positive
relationship between household income and the quantity of maize sold can be observed
(Appendix 5).  Notice, for example, that total household income almost doubles between the
75
th quartile and the 100
th quartile.
Second, attempts to offer prices that would make maize production profitable in all areas of
Zambia would pose major demands on the public treasury.  The CMA proposal does not
specify how it will support marketed maize production from disadvantaged and remote areas
without incurring large treasury losses.  Based on the available data, we feel there is very
limited potential to support prices in selected rural areas without incurring trading losses.
Third, attempts to support prices can have an unsettling impact on commodity markets,
possibly increasing marketing cost by creating additional  uncertainty among private traders. 
Simply announcing a support price based upon an assumption of future funding by
Government would change the plans of traders.  If subsequently funding to support the
announced price level failed to arrive those traders acquiring grain, based upon the
announcement, would be left holding the bag.  Traders in turn would be less inclined to
participate in the market or would require a higher margin to deal with the increased
uncertainty.  Added uncertainty and the competition created by a government agency able to
offer higher prices to farmers by incurring trading losses would be expected to drive at least
some private traders out of the market.  This could conceivably reduce competition and raise
marketing margins for farmers other than those selling to the CMA.
A somewhat more technical discussion of problems associated with design and consequences 
of schemes to support farm prices, with implications for the CMA proposal, is included in
Appendix 6.
7. Grain marketing policies need to recognize the sources of marketed maize and
take into account the structure of the rural and urban maize market. Urban
smallholders and commercial farmers combined are more important sources
of maize supply to urban areas than rural smallholders.
The focus in the CMA proposal and the discussions about the policy seem to focus
exclusively on the smallholder farming sector, paying little attention to the importance of
production of staple crops by commercial farmers and urban growers. The production
decisions of commercial farmers especially will influence and be influenced by any CMA
actions affecting market supplies and prices.  Because commercial farmers generally have
greater capacity to respond to changes in incentives, they can be very important in any policy
intended to deal with prices or production and supply instability. A good example is the
2002/03 maize harvest, where commercial farmers responded to market demand and
produced 411,000 MT of maize, which is a significant portion of urban demand. In addition,
some 50,000 MT of maize is estimated to be produced by urban smallholders.7    The MACO/CSO Post Harvest Survey (PHS) provides maize production estimates for smallholders
and commercial farmers. In addition, CSO’s Living Conditions Monitoring Survey data were used to estimate
smallholder production of maize in urban areas, not covered by the PHS. Using the 1998 LCMS data, the urban
production as a proportion of rural production was projected over the 1999/00 PHS rural production estimate.
Because urban LCMS respondents were not specifically asked whether their plots were actually located in
urban areas, only plots smaller than 1 hectare (i.e. most conceivable to be located within the urban boundaries)
were counted for this analysis.
8  However, based on information supplied by millers, urban supplies may be underestimated in this
paper. Maize purchases by large-scale millers (as reported during a rapid appraisal by FSRP in 2002) during
2000/01exceeded 450,000 MT, and unknown volumes of maize processed by urban hammer mills have to be
added. The majority of meal produced by large-scale millers remains in urban areas, as only 13,000 MT of
processed mealie meal from urban areas were purchased by rural households in 1999/00 (according to the
CSO’s 1999/00 Post Harvest Survey and Supplemental Survey).  Therefore, it is possible that urban smallholder
and large-scale commercial maize production are underestimated, although no data are available to verify this.
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The 1999/00 growing season was a season in which the maize crop  met national demand
during the subsequent marketing season.  Based on this year, for production and
consumption,  the data below identify an estimate of grain marketed from that crop
originating from rural and urban smallholder growers and from commercial farmers.
7




(1) Smallholder production retained by producers 662,700
(2) Smallholder production marketed within rural areas 42,700
(3) Smallholder production marketed outside rural areas 145,100
(4) Total production by rural smallholders 850,500
(5) Production by urban smallholders 56,200
(6) Production by commercial farmers 201,500
 (7) Total maize production (4 + 5 + 6) 1,108,300
Assuming that all of the urban smallholder and commercial farmer production was marketed
in urban areas, and that imports and exports evened out during the 2000/01 marketing season,
the estimated rural availability of maize is 705,460 MT ((1) + (2)), and urban availability of
maize is 402,801 MT ((3) + (5) + (6)).
8  
The rural surplus in 1999/00 of some 145,000 MT represented only 17% of total smallholder
maize production, meaning that 83% of rural smallholder maize production was consumed
within the rural areas. Although maize surpluses produced by rural smallholders are
important, large-scale commercial production, urban agriculture, and imports account for the
major sources of maize to feed the urban population and meet industrial requirements
(roughly 64% in a good production year, and most likely more in a poor production year).   If12
an improved and more stable urban food supply is the objective, these three sources of maize
procurement should not be neglected. 
Smallholder production estimates for the past two crops of maize were less than estimated
smallholder consumption, suggesting net imports to smallholder households as a group.
Functioning urban-to-rural market linkages become important during such deficit seasons.
This raises a question of what the role of a CMA would be during years with such short
crops?
8. The problem of inter-seasonal variations in production and food security, and
the scope of inter-seasonal reserve stocks.
The second major function of the proposed CMA is to acquire and manage a commodity
reserve stock. The objective of the national food security reserve as stated in the CMA
Concept Note is  “...ensuring cereal supplies in the country for a total of at least three months,
which is the period that provides enough lead time to organise local or imported supplies in
case of food emergencies”. In other words, once food emergencies are identified, CMA
should be able to ensure that the country can be supplied with food for three months, while
subsequent supplies are being arranged. A specific function of the reserve is also to “sell and
buy stocks of selected crops as and when the market requires”, suggesting that the reserve is
used as a market stabilization mechanism.
How do the food emergencies that CMA is expected to cope with come about? Food
emergencies are part of the production instability problem, which is in turn caused not only
by the weather, but also by market policies and input subsidies.  If maize production is to
become more stable, it should only be promoted in economically and agriculturally suitable
areas. Crop production in general could be increased and much of the instability in
production could be reduced by providing information on the economic and agronomic
viability of alternative crops and practices.  Increased production of groundnuts, cotton,
sorghum, millets, sweet potatoes and cassava, and the rapid and widespread adoption of
conservation farming technology are ongoing trends that could benefit further from informed
extension messages based on field trial experiments in various regions of the country.
Subsidizing fertilizer for use on maize in drought prone areas would be expected to
contribute to production instability.  Fertilizer is essentially free to those not repaying
fertilizer loans, or it is artificially cheap for those paying 50% of the commercial value. For
those farmers, little is lost from its use in drought years and production is increased in years
of good rainfall. The result is more production and lower prices in good crop years.  Full
pricing of fertilizer would likely make application in drought-prone areas unprofitable in both
cases and reduce instability. Another factor contributing to production instability is price risk.
During a deficit season, prices increase and encourage more production. When the increased
production the next year results in a surplus, there is a risk that prices will be depressed. In
order to mitigate the risk of depressed market prices, which can be a subsequent disincentive
to plant maize again the next season, farmers expect to have export opportunities for their
maize in surplus seasons and require an assurance that any import subsidies or other
interventions will not disadvantage them. This will only work if free imports and exports are
consistently allowed. Although this is a national policy issue, its success depends on the
region-wide implementation of the COMESA Free Trade Area, and the SADC Trade
Protocol.13
How have government, donors and the private sector coped so far, without the reserve facility
that is proposed? Recent food emergencies have been dealt with by a combination of efforts
by  Government, private sector, and donors, without needing and using large physical reserve
stocks. Despite the name, food emergencies do not occur overnight. They are identified well
in advance, during the growing season, often with several months’ notice. Therefore, the
perceived necessity for CMA to ensure food supply for three months while imports are
arranged seems redundant. Government, with the assistance of donors, typically intervene to
cater for the needs of the vulnerable groups, mainly in rural areas. As indicated above,
improved policies could actually reduce the number of households at risk. The needs of the
market have been met through commercial imports by the private sector, sometimes in
conjunction with Government. Again, improved policies and procedures could improve the
private sector’s commercial capability and market coverage. Hence, it seems that Zambia has
the potential to become food self-reliant without the need to become food self-sufficient. A
policy of food self-reliance would focus on the ability to meet any food shortfalls on the
international market, while having the economic capacity to do so by producing the mix of
commodities that maximizes agricultural growth and stability, thereby reducing the
susceptibility to food security risk. Food self-reliance would therefore require little or no
costly physical reserves, but rather a financial buffer as well as an active private sector,
stimulated by incentives to operate to full capacity.
One of the biggest constraints at the moment is the limited presence of private traders who
have the capacity to operate on the regional and international markets. Attracted by the
seemingly consistent trade liberalization policies pursued by Government during the early
nineties, the sector experienced a significant development of local and international private
traders, operating in rural areas and across borders. Large international commodity trading
firms such as Cargill, Louis Dreyfus, Glencore and Exatrade all participated competitively on
the Zambian market. From anecdotal evidence we know that trading uncertainties such as
export restrictions have caused all of these firms to eventually leave Zambia during the mid
to late nineties, often after incurring trading losses due to depressed market prices and lack of
export opportunities. Although it is often argued that the private sector does not have the
capacity to perform crop marketing functions, it would be more appropriate to state that the
private sector’s capacity exists, but is not fully engaged due to disincentives in the form of
high trading risks posed by government interventions. Inter-seasonal storage can be
profitable and can be done by large private firms once they have confidence in the market. To
achieve that, market uncertainties must be reduced and major trade barriers such as export
restrictions and import subsidies have to be removed. 
Administering reserve stocks in Zambia would not be a simple matter of buying in a deficit
season and selling in a surplus season. Total production of maize in the 1999/00 season was
considered just adequate for domestic demand. Maize production fluctuates greatly in
Zambia, largely due to erratic weather.  Maize production was as low as 480,000 MT in
1991/92 and as high as 1.4m MT in 1995/96. Since market liberalization in 1993/94, only the
1993/94, the 1995/96 and the 1999/00 seasons produced sufficient maize to meet domestic
demand (between 1 and 1.1 million MT), with only the 1995/96 season producing a large
surplus of some 400,000 MT.  Unless reserve stocks are replenished by imported
commodities, Zambia may not produce sufficient in good years to provide a quantity
sufficient to continuously supply a storage program. 14
If Government requires some form of reserve, it could consider holding a financial buffer. If
the objective is to secure and guarantee physical availability of maize outside Zambia, but
within the region, the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) offers suitable instruments
such as white and yellow maize futures contracts and options. If Zambia requires imports, the
CMA would be in a position to purchase options for the supply of maize, with the possibility
(but without the obligation) to buy the physical commodity later on, almost identical to an
insurance. 
Although the above arguments suggest market-led national food security management, could
there still be a legitimate role for Government to facilitate market supplies? The marketing
channels supplying small-scale traders, hammer millers, and retailers with maize grain,
typically become very thin later in the season when local smallholder production becomes
depleted. In recent years, import channels were not well designed to supply these informal
channels, and imported maize was channeled exclusively through large mills (see FSPR
Policy Synthesis no. 5 and no. 6). As a result of this, low-income consumers, who prefer
hammer milled meal, had no choice but to purchase more expensive industrially milled meal.
To meet the needs of the poor, there may be a legitimate role for government to facilitate the
supply of maize to informal markets in small lots to supply the small traders and hammer
millers. In deficit years, Government could facilitate the importation of maize, while in
surplus years Government could facilitate local supplies, when needed.
9. Reducing unintended consequences through transparent and explicit
operation modalities.
It is impossible to predict all of the consequences of a policy like the establishment of a CMA
because of the large number of variables, many unpredictable, that can influence outcomes. 
Particularly important in this case is the fact that the performance of the CMA will depend on
many operating decisions and practices that have yet to be specified.  The details of
implementation design will affect outcomes.  Also important is the fact that organizations
evolve responding to changes in the physical and political environment.  Greater credibility
and external support for the proposed CMA may occur when the details on the CMA’s design
and its implementation modalities are specified and made public.  The CMA’s ability to
achieve stated Government objectives are likely to be considerably improved with explicit
attention to how the CMA will avoid the political interference and financial arrears that have
plagued the two previous Government marketing boards with similar functions -- the FRA
and NAMBOARD.  Recent history suggests that there will be great pressures on the CMA to
respond to political pressures to act in ways not entirely consistent with its stated mandate. 
We propose that more detailed analysis of the CMA proposal be analyzed after the explicit
operating modalities for the agency have been determined.
The proposed CMA policy is for the marketing function to operate without incurring
financial losses.  However, the hearings and debate on the policy revealed some strong
advocates for price supports including making the CMA a buyer of last resort.  When a
marketing agency operates by artificially squeezing its trading margin and accumulating
losses -- it erodes the trading incentives of commercial traders who cannot afford to squeeze
their margins in this way.  Under such a scenario, the CMA activities would cause an exit of
commercial traders from the maize marketing system rather than nurture their development. 
There is abundant evidence from Eastern and Southern Africa showing that marketing board15
operations have squeezed out the development of the private trading system (e.g, Pinckney,
1993; McKenzie and Chenoweth, 1992; Amani and Maro 1992, Smith 1995, Westlake 1994). 
If the development of commercial markets remains an important objective of the CMA
proposal,  we propose that Government aim to specify the modalities of CMA operation to
enable ex ante evaluation of their effects on commercial market development
As we have seen with the planning of recent maize imports, it is extremely important for
Government and CMA to make realistic announcements regarding upcoming market
interventions. For example, if CMA has announced that it will purchase 200,000 MT of
maize directly from farmers in rural areas, the private sector will largely remain absent from
the rural marketing scene, and cannot reasonably be expected to participate at the last minute
when CMA experiences funding constraints that would only allow it to purchase 30,000 MT.
Rather, CMA should announce planned interventions only to the extent that finances are in
place. In the above example, it should announce arrangements only for the 30,000 MT it is
actually able to purchase. That way, the private sector can plan its own activities that would
complement those of CMA, thus reducing the potential vacuum that would otherwise
develop.
The history of organizations similar to the proposed CMA may be instructive in considering
the possible evolution of a CMA. What can we learn from past parastatal crop marketing
experiences?  NAMBOARD, ZCF, Lima Bank, CUSA, and now FRA have all incurred
heavy losses and have not left behind a sustainable trade-based crop marketing system.
Unprofitable transactions, mostly in the form of subsidies, as a percentage of the total
Government budget, increased from 5.5% in 1984 to 16% in 1989. In that year, maize
subsidies accounted for about 40% of the all-time high deficit of 35% of total Government
expenditure. By 1990, maize subsidies were larger than the total budget deficit (Mwanaumo,
1994). Government was no longer able to sustain this subsidy system, which eventually
resulted in dissolution of NAMBOARD and other parastatal organizations. Today,
Government’s cash budget would be unlikely to support large subsidy systems due to the
limited availability of cash resources.
More recent experiences under FRA have shown that losses incurred by its input and credit
delivery programs were re-paid by using the food reserve budget allocation. In 1999/00, this
resulted in a loss of some US$10 million, which was repaid by Government. In the process,
FRA did not meet its original mandate of maintaining food security stocks.
10. Aspects of financing
To avoid unnecessary overproduction of maize, the limits of the market must be known, both
domestic and international. The maize outflow by smallholders from rural areas in 1999/00
was about 145,000 MT, which could be used as a benchmark. The same would apply to
commercial farmers, who supplied some 200,000 MT of maize in 1999/00, are likely to
supply some 400,000 MT during the 2003/04 marketing season, and who appear to be the
single most important source of maize for the urban market. Theoretically, CMA could
handle between 345,000 and 550,000 MT of maize. However, if a well-functioning and
sustainable marketing system is to evolve, the private sector should handle a substantial
proportion of marketable surpluses from smallholders as well as commercial farmers.9    Assuming a purchase price of K25,000/50kg, plus the costs of transport, 6 months storage, insurance,
CMA overheads and losses, totaling K42,500/50kg, or K850,000/MT.
10  Assuming that the food reserve unit within CMA purchases maize from the crop marketing unit for
K42,500/50kg and stores it for 24 months, and incurs the usual costs related to storage and overheads, bringing
the total cost to K61,000/50kg.
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Budget allocations from Government may become CMA’s constraining factor. The table
below illustrates the capital required to purchase the following varying volumes of maize
9.






  20,000    400,000   17.0
   50,000 1,000,000   42.5
100,000 2,000,000   85.0
200,000 4,000,000 170.0
Going by past budget allocations for FRA and the extremely limited disbursements that were
actually made (rarely exceeding K10 billion in one season), CMA’s scale of operations in the
first seasons may not exceed 50,000 MT of maize. The important implication here is that it is
crucial for Government to encourage the private sector to participate in the market.
As with crop marketing, the availability of sufficient working capital is important for the
establishment of a food security reserve. The table below illustrates the capital required to
purchase the following varying volumes of maize and store it for 24 months
10. 






  20,000    400,000    24.4
  50,000 1,000,000    48.8
100,000 2,000,000    97.6
200,000 4,000,000 195.2
This is working capital in addition to the working capital required for crop marketing, and it
would be tied up for as long as the respective stock levels are maintained. Part of this capital
may be lost, or profits can be made, as and when stocks are sold. It is outside the scope of
this paper to estimate these potential gains or losses.17
11. Is input and credit distribution the answer to increasing smallholder farmers
crop production and incomes? Is it an appropriate function for the CMA?
A recent review of the fertilizer sector by MACO/FSRP (see FSRP Working Papers No. 4
and 5) suggested that fertilizer distribution alone is not the “silver bullet”. Furthermore, past
experience has shown that input and credit delivery are a drain on scarce Government
resources, and has the potential to divert those same resources away from CMA’s crop
marketing capability as well as investments needed to develop the agricultural sector.
The review found that:
a. Only 20% of smallholder farmers used fertilizer in 1999/00.  These
households were relatively better-off than households who did not use
fertilizer. The government’s program was not significantly more likely to
deliver fertilizer to poor farmers and remote areas than private firms. The
recipients of government-subsidized fertilizer were better off, on average, than
those who did not receive the subsidized fertilizer.
b. Evidence suggests that the government programs created an un-level playing
field for fertilizer trading and reduced the possibilities for private firms
unaffiliated with the government programs to develop and expand the scope
and scale of their services.
c. Promoting fertilizer use in areas where its use is not profitable, would
represent a loss in national income, not the elimination of a constraint to
efficient use of fertilizer.
d. Even in the districts where fertilizer use is the highest (e.g., Mazabuka,
Chipata, Mkushi), the CSO’s national survey data indicate that no more than
50% of small-scale farmers use fertilizer despite the fact that it is available for
purchase or swap by private traders.  Small-scale farmers differ considerably
in their resources, ability to make investments and take risks, and in their
knowledge.  These and other resource- and knowledge-related constraints of
small-scale farmers (besides the cost of fertilizer) explain why so many do not
use fertilizer despite its availability in relatively “high-potential” and “well-
connected” areas.  The limited use of fertilizer in Zambia’s small-scale
farming sector is more complex than simply agro-ecology, infrastructure, and
credit.  Identifying these other household-level constraints and overcoming
them will raise the value of using fertilizer to farmers and to the nation.
Fertilizer use is not profitable for many smallholders in Zambia. Recent research using on-
farm and trial data in six areas shows that applying recommended amounts of fertilizer on
maize was profitable only in two of six sites for which data was available from the Ministry
of Agriculture (Donovan et al. 2002).
In areas where some of these adverse conditions prevail, the limited presence of private
traders does not infer weak private sector response to policy reform, but it is a reflection of
the more fundamental reasons why fertilizer use is unprofitable for many smallholders. These18
reasons help to explain why 80% of the small-scale farmers in Zambia do not use fertilizer.
The bottom line is that fertilizer on its own, without complementary practices and inputs, was
found  not to be cost-effective. It is very important to understand why the application of
fertilizer on maize appears to be unprofitable for many small-scale farmers.  There are seven
main reasons:
a. Inappropriate application rate recommendations
b.   Lack of availability of improved maize seed:  The ability of fertilizer to
benefit farmers depends on their use of seed varieties that are responsive to
fertilizer application.  Less than 50% of maize grown by smallholder was
grown using hybrid seed in 1999/00.
c.   Highly variable farmer management practices: Better management practices
could make it more profitable for farmers to use fertilizer.  Many factors affect
yield response of fertilizer application, including timing of application, seed
spacing, row spacing, adoption of conservation farming practices, etc.  This
points up the need for better extension and management education.
d. Output market price effects: As the proportion of farmers using fertilizer
increases, crop production rises and prices fall.  Effectively tackling some of
the other problems mentioned here will help to reduce the costs of crop
production and make the use of fertilizer more profitable for small-scale
farmers.
e. Poor rural infrastructure: High transport costs adversely affect fertilizer
profitability in two ways:  they reduce output prices and raise the cost of
fertilizer.
f. Poor soils and/or rainfall:  some parts of Zambia are simply not suited to
fertilizer application on maize at any realistic range of input and output prices. 
In other regions, fertilizer use might be economically viable in combination
with lime application  to promote the incomes and living standards of many of
the 80% of households that are currently not using fertilizer. 
Given that fertilizer and credit alone, without a full complement of additional inputs and
production extension, the CMA should not include the distribution of inputs and credit as one
of its functions.  Such government sponsored distribution system for fertilizer and credit will
create more problems than it solves, and will leave many smallholder farmers less well off.
Recent history has shown how FRA’s core mandate of maintaining a food reserve was never
achieved due to the financial losses incurred by fertilizer distribution, which would suggest
that input programs are best kept financially and operationally isolated from CMA.
12. Final comments
Based on the existing CMA proposal (which provides only a broad description of the CMA’s
mandate), many questions remain unanswered as to how the CMA will be able to promote
the achievement of key Government objectives that the agency was envisaged to address.19
Much remains to be specified in order to undertake a more detailed and comprehensive
assessment.  We propose that the CMA’s operational modalities be more fully and explicitly
worked out, and then subjected to a detailed cost-benefit analysis at that point before
deciding on whether to bring the CMA into being.
We have discussed some of the potential problems that are likely to result from
implementation of the CMA as currently specified.  These issues should constitute the focus
of the next stage in the CMA deliberation: 
a. On what basis will Government determine “areas with potentially profitable
market opportunities but where private sector involvement is currently
insufficient,” and where are they located?
b. Where crop buying centers may be justified on commercial grounds?
c. If the CMA is to buy and sell at market prices to avoid incurring trading
deficits (as implied in the CMA proposal), then to what extent will
smallholders gain as compared to the current situation? 
d. If higher-than-market-prices were offered, what additional production can be
expected?  Which smallholders would be able to respond to higher rural
prices?  What would be the impact of buying at higher-than-market-prices on
the national treasury and on incentives for private traders to continue their
operations?
e. If CMA wishes to purchase sufficient volumes of maize to put upward
pressure on producer prices in smallholder areas of Zambia, what effect would
this have on wholesale and retail prices of maize and maize meal?  
f. What will be the criteria used by a food reserve facility to accumulate stocks,
sell off stocks, and rely on domestic markets vs. external markets to procure or
sell grain? 
g. How will CMA be able to overcome the problems of patronage and
interference that plagued NAMBOARD and FRA?
By all accounts, Zambia’s grain marketing system can be developed considerably to enable it
to better achieve important social and economic development goals in Zambia.  There is
much room for improvement.  Government action is clearly required to improve grain
marketing performance.   Public policy is a process of selecting among alternatives uses of
scarce resources.
The following are a few alternatives for consideration of scarce state resources to address the
grain marketing problems of small-scale farmers:
a. Undertake a range of public investments that reduce the costs of marketing in
smallholder areas.  These include road investments, supporting the
development of the transportation sector through reducing taxes on fuel,20
imported spare parts, and capital equipment.  Other improvements involve
helping to rehabilitate the railway system and integrate it with operations in
South Africa and Tanzania.
b. Make a greater commitment to collecting and disseminating reliable grain
market information in the country.  The existing commitment to the
Agricultural Marketing Information Centre is weak. The Ministry staff
assigned to AMIC are frequently moved to other positions after being trained
in the operation and management of the system, which impedes progress and
requires extra donor resources to keep the system functioning.  The
development of a reliable and efficient market information system is an
important role for government in a market-oriented economy.
c. Avoid undertaking activities that erode traders’ willingness to invest in the
grain marketing system.  Unless government policy changes to one in which it
attempts to directly handle the bulk of smallholders’ grain marketing services,
then the private sector’s capacity should be promoted.  Government operations
that compete with the private sector but do so in a way that artificially
squeezes the spatial and temporal price spreads that they face are likely to
erode the private sector’s participation in markets.  Most important in this
context: Reduce the use of ad-hoc export restrictions, that make investment in
holding grain stocks or investing in marketing facilities too risky to undertake. 
It is also important to avoid announcing Government plans to import
commodities to meet food security needs and later announce a change in plans
due to budget constraints. 
d. The limitation on the economically efficient use of fertilizer seems to be lack
of knowledge and lack of credit. Can a new institution be developed within the
Zambian situation that would offer a combination of credit and knowledge
about profitable fertilizer use combined with the means to assure repayment?
e. Many of the food supply problems appear to be due to the selection of
inappropriate cropping patterns and practices.  Would investment in selected
research, extension projects designed to identify and promote improved
cropping patterns and practices return more than comparable investment in the
CMA? Public support of agricultural research and extension systems is
required to generate more fertilizer-responsive varieties and more appropriate
application recommendation domains would help to reduce the costs of grain
production by smallholder farmers.  This would help to overcome some of the
marketing problems that make maize production (and fertilizer use on maize)
unprofitable in some areas of Zambia (e.g., Donovan et al., 2002; Govereh et
al., forthcoming).
These are only examples of relevant questions.  Raising these questions does not represent an
argument for or against the proposed CMA, only an argument for an informed policy
decision.   21
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Appendix 1. Financial viability of exporting maize from major maize-producing










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Maize net selling districts 575,300 456,800 -21% 188,400 50,500 137,100
Central  Chibombo 43,800 34,100 -22% 22,000 4,000 17,900
 Kabwe Urban 3,900 2,500 -36% 900 300 600
 Kapiri Mposhi 13,000 7,100 -45% 4,200 1,600 2,600
 Mkushi 10,100 8,800 -13% 5,400 1,600 3,800
 Mumbwa 30,400 22,300 -27% 13,000 2,100 10,900
 Serenje 9,000 11,500 28% 2,800 1,200 1,500
Copperbelt
Chililabombwe
1,600 1,200 -25% 700 400 400
 Chingola 3,600 3,000 -17% 3,000 200 2,800
 Kalulushi 2,600 2,300 -12% 1,500 300 1,200
 Kitwe 1,000 700 -30% 600 400 200
 Luanshya 3,100 2,600 -16% 1,700 100 1,700
 Lufwanyama 10,800 6,000 -44% 4,000 1,000 3,000
 Masaiti 14,200 6,400 -55% 2,200 2,000 200
 Mpongwe 9,500 4,600 -52% 3,700 400 3,300
 Mufulira 900 800 -11% 400 400 100
Eastern  Chipata 66,800 41,700 -38% 8,600 4,400 4,200
 Katete 47,800 36,700 -23% 5,200 2,700 2,600
 Petauke 60,800 45,500 -25% 22,500 3,400 19,100
Luapula  Milenge 1,800 1,600 -11% 1,000 300 700
Lusaka  Chongwe 12,400 8,700 -30% 3,400 2,100 1,300
 Kafue 8,400 8,300 -1% 3,500 1,000 2,500
Northern  Kasama 4,500 2,300 -49% 1,800 400 1,400
 Mbala 10,200 12,300 21% 4,400 1,000 3,400
 Mpika 9,600 6,200 -35% 2,700 900 1,800
 Nakonde 3,300 2,500 -24% 1,100 400 700
Northwestern  Kasempa 7,000 3,800 -46% 2,100 200 1,900
 Mufumbwe 1,200 800 -33% 300 200 200
 Mwinilunga 1,700 2,600 53% 1,900 800 1,000
Southern  Choma 41,900 43,700 4% 14,400 3,900 10,500
 Kalomo 45,200 31,000 -31% 21,200 4,500 15,600
 Mazabuka 40,600 44,900 11% 16,100 3,000 13,100
 Monze 36,100 30,300 -16% 7,200 3,800 3,400
 Namwala 18,500 20,000 8% 4,900 1,500 3,500
Maize producing and self-
sufficient districts
56,500 31,100 -45% 5,100 2,900 2,200
Eastern  Chadiza 22,000 13,000 -41% 1,900 1,000 1,000
 Mambwe 13,100 7,700 -41% 1,000 700 200
 Nyimba 21,400 10,400 -51% 2,200 1,200 1,000
Source: Authors’ computations using post-harvest survey data, 1999/00, Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.23
Appendix 2. Financial viability of exporting maize from districts that are either net











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Maize net buying districts 37,200 52,800 42% 4,000 13,400 -9,500
Northwestern  Zambezi 1,200 1,500 25% 200 800 -600
Southern  Gwembe 2,100 3,300 57% 100 600 -500
 Itezhi-tezhi 3,400 2,600 -24% 500 900 -400
 Kazungula 10,400 1,700 -84% 1,200 2,000 -800
 Livingstone 700 500 -29% 200 300 -200
 Siavonga 4,000 3,200 -20% 200 600 -400
 Sinazongwe 4,600 5,800 26% 500 1,900 -1,400
Western  Kalabo 3,400 1,800 -47% 900 1,900 -1,000
 Mongu 7,400 32,400 338% 200 4,400 -4,200
Maize low-producing, low-
consuming districts
120,700 102,600 -15% 24,600 22,800 2,900
Eastern  Chama 10,800 8,600 -20% 700 100 700
 Lundazi 32,800 29,100 -11% 4,800 2,500 2,300
Luapula  Chienge 700 2300 229% 400 700 -300
 Kawambwa 3,100 2,900 -6% 1,600 1,400 200
 Mansa 2,000 1,800 -10% 900 600 300
 Mwense 2,800 2,200 -21% 500 700 -100
 Nchelenge 3,300 2,100 -36% 600 900 -300
 Samfya 900 1300 44% 400 1,500 -1,200
Lusaka  Luangwa 1,100 500 -55% 200 400 -300
Northern  Chilubi 100 200 100% 0 100 -100
 Chinsali 2,300 2,000 -13% 400 400 0
 Isoka 4,200 4,200 0% 900 700 200
 Kaputa 1,500 5,300 253% 600 1,300 -700
 Luwingu 2,000 1,200 -40% 600 100 500
 Mporokoso 2,100 2,400 14% 600 1,100 -500
 Mpulungu 1,300 1,000 -23% 600 400 200
 Mungwi 2,100 2,600 24% 1,200 400 700
Northwestern  Chavuma 400 500 25% 0 100 -100
 Kabompo 4,300 3,200 -26% 1,200 400 800
 Solwezi 6,700 6,400 -4% 1,200 2,100 300
Western  Kaoma 7,100 5,400 -24% 1,700 2,400 -700
 Lukulu 2,200 2,600 18% 900 1,100 -200
 Senanga 11,800 4,500 -62% 2,000 2,400 -400
 Sesheke 7,200 4,000 -44% 1,400 600 800
 Shangombo 7,900 6,300 -20% 1,200 400 800
Source: authors’ computations from Post Harvest Survey data, 1999/00, Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.24



























Central 25.7 13.1 2.0 32.1 26.1
Copperbelt 25.7 20.9 5.5 34.4 13.3
Eastern 22.6 4.3 1.0 28.3 43.1
Luapula 10.4 2.9 1.2 39.1 46.4
Lusaka 23.4 10.7 2.3 50.7 10.4
Northern 16.2 2.8 0.8 26.6 53.3
Northwestern 22.1 6.7 3.2 26.0 40.7
Southern 24.6 6.9 2.8 42.3 22.4
Western 12.4 4.9 1.8 41.3 39.1
Zambia 19.3 6.0 1.8 33.8 38.5
Source: authors’ computations from Post Harvest Survey data, 1999/00, Central Statistical
Office, Lusaka.25
Appendix 4. Concentration of smallholder maize sales among sellers, 1999/00 cropping
season26
Appendix 5. Relationship between household income and quantity of maize sold for
maize-selling smallholders, 1999/00 cropping season
Province
Mean household income by quartile of maize sales Overall
mean    25
th     50th    75th     100th
-------------------------US Dollars per household-------------------------
Central 255 397 493 1,004 588
Copperbelt 354 368 557    947 516
Eastern 272 374 398    979 423
Luapula 290 513 678 1,236 425
Lusaka 567 598 636 1,006 668
Northern 315 483 616 1,095 478
Northwestern 246 294 449    915 352
Southern 387 731 562 1,051 684
Western 264 370 563    897 385
Overall mean 305 433 512 1,014 49927
Appendix 6. An additional note on problems and consequences of commodity price
support
The consequences of a price support program depend upon the design of the program,
especially on the means of supporting the price and the rules followed in selling or disposing
of the purchased commodities, say maize, in Zambia..  If, for example, the CMA was
mandated to pay support prices to farmers but to do it without cost to the Government
budget, they could buy at higher than market prices would have been and break even by
selling part of their acquired grain in international markets, limiting domestic market supplies
enough to get prices high enough to support the subsidies.  This would benefit the few farmer
households receiving the higher prices but would cost the 40 % of smallholder households
who are net maize buyers.  Or the CMA, acting as an agent of the Government, could divert
the necessary quantity of their supply to a program to feed poor people who would otherwise
not buy the grain.  That would require an agency to decide who would be designated as
qualifying for “surplus”food and to find a way to insure that the grain did not get back into
the regular market. Or the necessary quantity might be diverted to be use as animal feed. 
There are many variations on the programs that have been devised to support farm prices and
incomes. Most of them end up as supply management programs or programs with losses paid
for from the government or perhaps donors. In Zambia, any attempt to raise prices to
smallholders would have to find a way to keep supplies from efficient commercial farmers
from finding their way into the CMA system or it would become a price support benefitting
mostly commercial farmers. The winners would be those getting the support prices and
whoever ends up getting cheap food.  The losers would be domestic consumers including the
40% or so of smallholders who are usually net maize buyers. 
A particularly inequitable practice that has followed from some attempts to support prices, is
for the marketing authority to sell its purchased grain exclusively to the large commercial
millers.  This pulls the marketed grain from the rural markets and diverts grain from urban
retail markets reducing the whole grain available for processing by hammer mills.  The result
is to reduce the total quantity of maize meal, because of the difference in milling rates, and
grain for home and local processing by rural net buyers.  Poor urban and rural buyers of grain
and meal share to costs of such programs along with the people contributing to  Government
revenues. Nutrition would suffer because of the lower nutritional value the meal compared
with hammer milled meal.